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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-4091
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANABELLE LUNA,
    Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-0013-2
(Honorable Sue L. Robinson)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 26, 2009
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Filed: February 20, 2009
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Anabelle Luna pled guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1342, and one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.  She
was sentenced to thirty-seven months imprisonment for wire fraud and twenty-four
      We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).1
2
months imprisonment for the aggravated identity theft, to be served consecutively as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.  Luna appeals her sentence, contending the District Court
incorrectly weighed her mitigating circumstances and treated the guidelines as mandatory. 
We disagree and will affirm.1
I.
Luna participated in a scheme in which fraudulent payroll checks were issued for
her and her co-defendants’ benefit.  After she entered her guilty plea, Luna requested a
downward departure from the guidelines range and made several objections to the pre-
sentence investigation report (PSR).  At sentencing, Luna withdrew all the objections
except one—that her criminal history category overrepresented the seriousness of her past
criminal conduct.  The District Court rejected her arguments and imposed a within-
guidelines sentence. 
In reviewing a criminal sentence, an appellate court should:
first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,
such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.  Assuming that the district court’s
sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). 
      Under the statute, the relevant factors are: 2
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed – (A) to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of
sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for . . . the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . .(6) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found




Luna alleges two procedural errors: first, failure to analyze the relevant downward
departure sentencing factors and second, treating the guidelines as mandatory.  In Nelson
v. United States, the Supreme Court held “the sentencing court must first calculate the
Guidelines range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual
defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),  explaining any2
variance from the former with reference to the latter.” No. 08-5657, slip op. at 2 (U.S.
Jan. 26, 2009), available at 2009 U.S. LEXIS 872, at *2 (footnote added); see also United
States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2006) (outlining a substantially identical
process for district courts to follow).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a within-guidelines
sentence, nor did it disregard Luna’s arguments for a downward departure.  Before the
4District Court, Luna argued that her criminal history was overstated because it was based
upon two crimes for which she did not serve any jail time.  She contends the court never
ruled on this objection.  Luna also contends the District Court failed to give adequate
consideration to any of the § 3553(a) factors.  The record belies both of these contentions.
The District Court carefully considered the two steps outlined in Nelson. It first
considered and calculated the guidelines range; it then considered Luna’s objections to
the PSR.  Contrary to Luna’s contention, the District Court specifically stated that “[w]ith
respect to the assignment of criminal history points to the 1998 conviction and the 1999
conviction, I believe these points were assigned consistent with the sentencing guidelines
and, therefore, that objection is overruled.”
With regard to Luna’s request for a downward departure, Luna and the
government submitted sentencing memoranda and addressed the court.  Luna’s brothers
testified in favor of a downward departure. In the end, however, the District Court, in its
reasoned and sound discretion, determined a within-Guidelines sentence was appropriate. 
Although the District Court did state that “personal history and characteristics is [sic] the
one factor under 3553(a) that are not really taken into account by the sentencing
guidelines,” it also stated that while “the defendant presents herself as a very sympathetic
person, . . . I don’t feel under these circumstances that a defendant’s personal
characteristics and history are so exceptional that I feel comfortable varying the sentence,
because that would also throw askew the sentencings of the two other primary people
5involved in the scheme.”  In the previous statement alone, the District Court took into
consideration at least two different § 3553(a) factors: the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities (§ 3553(a)(6)) and Luna’s background and personal circumstances
(§ 3553(a)(1)).
A sentencing court need not list every single § 3553(a) factor specifically; instead,
the “sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority. . . . Where a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at
hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and
arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.” Rita
v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (2007); accord United States v. Cooper, 437
F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).
Morever, the District Court acknowledged its legal authority to depart downward
from the guidelines range, implicitly recognizing the advisory nature of the Sentencing
guidelines under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  The District Court made
no procedural error nor was its decision substantively unreasonable.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
